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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NO. 44681
)
v. ) BINGHAM COUNTY NO. CR 2014-1861
)




STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following the grant of her petition for post-conviction relief, Ima Adele Evans appeals
from the district court’s amended order relinquishing jurisdiction and executing her unified
sentence of seven years, with three years fixed, for possession of a controlled substance.  She
contends the district court abused its discretion when it imposed this sentence upon her
considering the mitigating factors that exist in this case.  Mindful of the fact that she is currently
on  parole,  she  also  contends  the  district  court  abused  its  discretion  when  it  relinquished
jurisdiction over her.
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On March 26, 2014, Ms. Evans was stopped while driving a vehicle because her high
beams were activated, and her muffler was excessively loud.  (Presentence Investigation Report
(PSI), p.25.)  Ms. Evans was driving without a license, and officers discovered drug
paraphernalia and methamphetamine in the vehicle.  (PSI, p.3.)  Ms. Evans was charged by
Information  with  possession  of  a  controlled  substance.   (R.,  pp.47-48.)   She  entered  into  an
agreement with the State pursuant to which she agreed to plead guilty, and the State agreed to
dismiss related misdemeanor charges and recommend probation.  (R., pp.75-82, 84-86.)  The
district court accepted Ms. Evans’ guilty plea.  (Tr., p.14, Ls.13-20.)  At the change of plea
hearing, Ms. Evans told the district court she was addicted to marijuana, alcohol, and
methamphetamine, and admitted to knowingly possessing a pipe with methamphetamine residue.
(Tr., p.7, Ls.5-10, p.13, L.8 – p.14, L.12.)  At sentencing, the prosecutor recommended
probation.  (Tr., p.32, Ls.17-21.)  The district court did not follow this recommendation.  Instead,
the district court sentenced Ms. Evans to a unified term of seven years, with three years fixed,
and retained jurisdiction.  (Tr., p.39, L.9 – p.40, L.1.)  The judgment of conviction and order of
retained jurisdiction was entered on December 12, 2014.  (R., pp.114-17.)  Ms. Evans did not
appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Ms. Evans refused to participate in the rider program, and the Idaho Department of
Corrections (IDOC) recommended that the district court relinquish jurisdiction over Ms. Evans.
(Addendum to Presentence Investigation Report (APSI), pp.1, 4-6; Tr., p.51, L.6 – p.52, L.7.)
The district court relinquished jurisdiction over Ms. Evans following a hearing.  (Tr., p.52, Ls.6-
7.)  The order relinquishing jurisdiction was entered on April 6, 2015.  (R., pp.128-29.)
Ms. Evans did not appeal from the order relinquishing jurisdiction.
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Ms. Evans filed a petition for post-conviction relief on January 19, 2016.1  (See Mot. to
Aug., Ex. A, p.1.)  She alleged her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely notice
of appeal from either the judgment of conviction or the order relinquishing jurisdiction.2  (See
Mot. to Aug., Ex. A, pp.2-4.)  On November 20, 2016, the district court entered an order granting
Ms. Evans’ petition for post-conviction relief, and entered an amended judgment of conviction in
the present case for the purpose of restarting the 42-day time period for Ms. Evans to file a
timely notice of appeal.  (Mot. to Aug., Ex. B.)
The district court entered an amended order relinquishing jurisdiction on November 29,
2016.  (R., pp.130-32.)  Ms. Evans filed a timely notice of appeal on December 1, 2016.
(R., pp.133-35.)  Ms. Evans was released on parole on May 17, 2017.3  (Mot. to Aug., Ex. C.)
1 The Record does not contain any documents from Ms. Evans’ post-conviction case, CV 2016-
0092, which documents are necessary for understanding the procedural history of this case.
Simultaneously with the filing of this brief, Ms. Evans is filing a motion to augment the record to
include the district court’s Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Respondent’s Motion for
Summary Dismissal, filed June 15, 2016, and the district court’s Order Granting Petitioner’s
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.  (See Mot. to Aug., Exs. A, B.)
2 Ms. Evans also alleged her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion pursuant to
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 for a reduction of sentence, but the district court granted the State’s
motion for summary dismissal with respect to this claim.  (Mot. to Aug., Ex. A, p.12.)
3 The Parole Commission issued a memorandum on May 17, 2017, advising that Ms. Evans was
released to parole.  The Record does not contain a copy of this memorandum.  In her motion to
augment,  Ms. Evans is  asking the Court  to include a copy of this memorandum in the Record.
(See Mot. to Aug., Ex. C.)
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ISSUES
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Ms. Evans to a unified term
of seven years, with three years fixed, for possession of a controlled substance?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over Ms. Evans




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Ms. Evans To A Unified Term Of
Seven Years, With Three Years Fixed, For Possession Of A Controlled Substance
Ms. Evans asserts that, given any view of the facts, her unified sentence of seven years,
with three years fixed, for possession of a controlled substance is excessive.  Where, as here, the
sentence imposed by the district court is within statutory limits, “the appellant bears the burden
of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834
(2011) (quoting State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875 (2011)).  “When a trial court exercises its
discretion in sentencing, ‘the most fundamental requirement is reasonableness.’” Id. (quoting
State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho 606, 608 (1991)).  “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to
accomplish  the  primary  objective  of  protecting  society  and  to  achieve  any  or  all  of  the  related
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.” Id. (citation omitted).  “When reviewing the
reasonableness of a sentence this Court will make an independent examination of the record,
‘having regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the
public interest.’” Id. (quoting State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982)).
The sentence the district court imposed upon Ms. Evans was not reasonable given the
nature of her offense and her character, and was not necessary to protect the public interest.
Ms.  Evans  was  stopped  in  a  relatively  mundane  traffic  stop,  and  “had  possession  of  a
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methamphetamine pipe . . . [a]nd a couple baggies.”  (Tr., p.13, Ls.8-13.)  She was 29 years old
at the time of the offense, and has struggled with alcohol and drug addiction for most of her life.
(PSI, pp.10, 14.)  The presentence investigator recommended intensive outpatient treatment, and
a term of probation, as recommended by both defense counsel and the prosecutor, would have
allowed her to undergo this necessary treatment.  (PSI, p.13.)
The  sentence  imposed  by  the  district  court  was  also  not  warranted  by  Ms.  Evans’
character, broadly defining character to include her mental and physical health.  Ms. Evans was
involved in two accidents and sustained concussions resulting in a traumatic head injury.  (PSI,
p.10.)   Counsel  for  Ms.  Evans  told  the  district  court  at  the  change  of  plea  hearing  about
Ms. Evans’ brain injury.  (Tr., p.8, Ls.14-21.)  At sentencing, counsel for Ms. Evans again
discussed Ms. Evans’ brain injury, describing it as “one of [her] greatest challenges.”  (Tr., p.22,
Ls.18-20.)  Counsel explained that he was contacted by an attorney who represented Ms. Evans
in a matter in Montana, and who forwarded medical reports to the jail to ensure that Ms. Evans is
receiving the necessary treatment.  (Tr., p.22, L.22 – p.23, L.1.)  Counsel told the district court
that Ms. Evans needs to see a neurologist, though he did not file a motion for a neurological or
psychological evaluation.4  (Tr., p.23, Ls.2-4.)  Importantly, counsel said he was concerned about
Ms. Evans’ ability to participate in a rider program in light of her brain injury.  (Tr., p.25, Ls.4-
8.)  Counsel said, “I think . . . if she goes on a rider, I think it’s going to be a bumpy road for her.
And I’m worried that it will end up being a situation in which they send a recommendation to
4 Counsel for Ms. Evans never filed a motion for a psychological evaluation pursuant to Idaho
Code § 19-2522(1), though the need for such an evaluation is clear.  Ms. Evans does not
challenge on appeal the district court’s failure to sua sponte order a psychological evaluation
because the Idaho Supreme Court held in State v. Carter, 155 Idaho 170 (2013), that the district
court’s failure to order a psychological evaluation is not reviewable on appeal where the
defendant neither requests such an evaluation in the district court nor objects at sentencing. Id. at
173.
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relinquish jurisdiction and ask the Court to impose the sentence.”  (Tr., p.25, Ls.17-25.)  The
prosecutor also acknowledged Ms. Evans’ injury, and noted that it “seemed to be glossed over in
the PSI.”  (Tr., p.33, Ls.19-24.)  The prosecutor echoed defense counsel’s concern regarding
Ms.  Evans’  ability  to  complete  a  rider,  stating,  “Our  concern  .  .  .  is  the  same [as]  counsel’s  in
that, if she does go on a rider, she’s just going to flunk out there and serve a prison sentence.”
(Tr., p.34, Ls.3-6.)
Despite knowing about Ms. Evan’s brain injury, and being warned that Ms. Evans would
not be able to successfully compete a rider, the district court nonetheless ignored the
recommendations for probation, and instead imposed a lengthy prison sentence and retained
jurisdiction.   This  was  not  necessary  to  protect  the  public,  as  there  was  never  any  discussion
about the risk posed by Ms. Evans stemming from this offense.  And after the district court
announced its sentence, there were additional statements from Ms. Evans that raised serious
concern about her mental health.  Ms. Evans asked the district court first to impose the sentence,
and then said she “wanted to fight it” and hire her own lawyer, and then said she wanted to “do
the whole seven years.”  (Tr., p.41, L.18 – p.44, L.4.)
In light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case—most significantly, Ms. Evans’
obvious mental and physical challenges, the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a
lengthy term of incarceration, and retained jurisdiction, sending Ms. Evans on a rider program
she was destined to fail.  The sentence does not reflect adequate consideration of the sentencing
factors by the district court and was an abuse of discretion.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over Ms. Evans And
Executed Her Unified Sentence Of Seven Years, With Three Years Fixed, For Possession Of A
Controlled Substance
This Court reviews a district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction for an abuse of
discretion. See State v. Latneau, 154 Idaho 165, 166 (2013); see also I.C. § 19-2601(4).  “A
court properly exercises its discretion when it (1) correctly perceives the issue to be one of
discretion, (2) acts within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, and (3) reaches its decision by an
exercise of reason.” Latneau, 154 Idaho at 166 (citation omitted).  The district court abused its
discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over Ms. Evans because it did not reach its decision
by an exercise of reason.  The district court retained jurisdiction over Ms. Evans, despite hearing
concerns from the prosecutor and defense counsel that Ms. Evans would not be able to complete
a rider program because of her brain injury.  When Ms. Evans was not able to complete her rider
program—arguably because of her brain injury—the district court abused its discretion in failing
to place her on probation.
Ms. Evans was assigned to the therapeutic community rider, which is a 270-day program.
(APSI, p.2.)  During the initial orientation, Ms. Evans threatened physical violence towards
another inmate and was removed for a 30-day reflection period.  (APSI, pp.4-5.)  She was
returned to the rider facility on March 5, 2015 to “restart the orientation process.”  (APSI, p.5.)
At  that  time,  it  was  reported  that  Ms.  Evans  broke  another  “cardinal  rule.”   (APSI,  p.5.)   This
was determined to be untrue, but Ms. Evans decided at that point that she was not interested in
discussing the matter and “refuse[d] programming.”  (APSI, p.5.)  She was transported out of the
rider facility on March 10, 2015.  (APSI, p.5.)  As both the prosecutor and defense counsel
8
anticipated at sentencing, the IDOC recommended the district court relinquish jurisdiction over
Ms. Evans due to her “refusal to participate in programming, and her resulting inability to
complete programming.”  (APSI, p.1.)
At the rider review hearing, counsel for Ms. Evans told the district court for the third time
about Ms. Evans’ brain injury.  Counsel explained, “Ms. Evans has a traumatic brain injury in
her history.  It severely impedes her ability to process information and to make wise decisions,
essentially, because she gets bound up and ends up allowing emotions to take control.”
(Tr., p.48, Ls.5-9.)  The district court did not adequately consider the fact that Ms. Evans’
behavior on her rider might stem from something other than a voluntary behavioral problem.
Ms. Evans’ physical limitations could well have impacted her ability to participate in the
structured programming offered on the rider.   Counsel for Ms. Evans explained to the district
court that at the beginning of his representation of Ms. Evans, he had to “work on rebuilding
rapport  .  .  .  and  establishing  a  relationship  with  her  .  .  .  almost  every  time I  would  meet  with
her.”   (Tr.,  p.49,  Ls.  2-7.)   It  is  understandable  that  someone  with  Ms.  Evans’  mental  and
physical limitations would be unsuccessful on a rider program, and the district court abused its
discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over Ms. Evans instead of placing her on probation,




For the reasons stated above, Ms. Evans respectfully requests that this Court reduce her
sentence as it deems appropriate.  Alternatively, and mindful of the fact that she is currently on
parole, Ms. Evans requests that this Court remand this case to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing and/or rider review hearing.
DATED this 5th day of July, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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